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Introduction 
The collapse of communist regimes in the beginning of 1990s has widened the scope of analyses 
explaining the relation between unemployment and wages. The new European Union members in 
Central and Eastern Europe have faced fast transition from centrally planned into market 
economies. This process has also involved big changes on their labour markets. Despite large scale 
structural changes and fast economic growth high unemployment remains one of the biggest 
challenges for the new members. 
The functioning of labour markets has a crucial role in restructuring the economy and eliminating 
inefficient labour allocation inherited from the socialist era. The importance of labour market 
flexibility even increases with the membership of the EU and eventually the EMU. The single 
currency reduces the variety of policy tools available to the members and demands extra flexibility 
of the local markets to absorb adverse shocks.  
Two different aspects can be regarded in relation with labour market flexibility – the market can 
react to shocks by changes in quantity or by changes in prices or both. Several studies have shown 
low intra- and international labour mobility in the EU. Therefore, labour mobility cannot be 
regarded as an effective source of economic adjustment (Patterson and Amati, 1998). Moreover, the 
widespread use of transition periods for opening up their labour markets by the “old” EU member 
states implies that the free movement of labour only constitutes marginally to labour market 
flexibility. Therefore we focus on the flexibility of domestic wages i. e. the price of labour. Wage 
flexibility is usually regarded as an effective and efficient way to absorb asymmetric shocks. 
Wage flexibility has been empirically tested in different specifications using a sample of OECD 
countries. Over the last decade this research has been extended to the transition countries. There are 
by now several studies empirically analyzing wage flexibility in the Central and Eastern European 
countries.  
However, the approach of regional and micro level flexibility dominates in the existing empirical 
tests. Many studies have found that regional wages tend to respond to local labour market 
conditions. Kertesi and Köllő (1997) e. g. estimated a “wage curve” on Hungarian micro level data 
and found the relations between the workers’ remuneration and the state of the labour market to be 
very similar to those observed in developed countries. The similarity of the wage curve between 
transition countries and developed countries was also concluded by Blanchflower (2000) for 11 
Eastern European countries using household survey data.  Iara and Traistaru (2003) found empirical 
evidence for a negative relation between real wages and unemployment in Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Poland using regional data, while the unemployment elasticity of pay for Romania was not   3
statistically significant. The result was confirmed for Poland by Yamaguchi (2005). His estimates 
also showed that wages are less elastic in a high-unemployment/low wage environment. The latter 
conclusion was confirmed by Galuk and Münich (2003) for the Czech Republic. Czech real wages 
adjust to changes in local employment in districts with low unemployment rates but in regions with 
high unemployment the elasticity of wages is not present. 
Radziwiłł and Walewski (2003) investigated the overall labour market elasticity in six EU candidate 
countries 1993-2002. They found negative and statistically significant relations between domestic 
unit labour costs and the change in the unemployment rate in only three countries – Lithuania, 
Poland and the Slovak Republic. In the other countries – in the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Latvia – labour markets seem to be remarkably inflexible. Babetskii (2006) tests real wage 
elasticities in eight CEECs using time-series and pooled estimates. He finds limited wage flexibility 
in three countries i. e. the Czech Republic, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic. The wages in 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Slovenia turned out to be inflexible. An interesting finding of 
Babetskii (2006) is that wage flexibility in all the CEECs in the period 2000-2004 is lower than in 
the period 1995-1999 and that the wage elasticity have become insignificantly different form zero in 
a number of CEECs.  
Summing up (see  
Table 1), in general the previous research has shown different regional elasticities of wages in 
several CEECs. The aggregate responsiveness of wages to the labour market conditions found less 
confirmation in a couple of existing studies. 
Table 1. Overview of existing research on wage flexibility in the Big CEECs. 
The goal of our paper is to estimate macroeconomic wage flexibility in four Central and Eastern 
European countries (Big CEECs) – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic 
– and compare it with the “old” EU members
1. We use the bargaining-augmented Phillips curve 
model developed by Blanchard and Katz (1999). In regression analysis annual data is used to take 
into account the long-term phenomenon of wage flexibility. We also attempt to link differences in 
aggregate wage flexibility to differences in the underlying labour market characteristics and 
institutions.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we compare the labour market 
developments in the countries and country groups. The differences and similarities in the 
institutional setting are analysed in the third section. The fourth section reports regression results for 
                                                 
1 We use a benchmark sample of six EU countries – Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom (EU6).   4
the wage curves for the Big CEECs and the EU6. The study ends with conclusions and some policy 
suggestions for the governments of the new EU members and candidate countries. 
 
2. Labour market developments in the Big CEECs 
In the beginning of the 1990s the economies of several countries behind the iron curtain were 
drastically reformed. Price liberalisation and strict monetary policy resulted in a sharp decline in 
output. Subsidies for enterprises were cut and this together with privatisation led to abrupt 
corrections to the ineffective labour allocation. As a result unemployment rates rose sharply and 
became one of the major problems for the governments in these countries until today. Figure 1 
shows the evolution of unemployment in the Big CEECs compared with the EU6. By average the 
unemployment rate of the Big CEECs has exceeded the unemployment rate of the EU6 over the last 
15 years. After the first dramatical political and economic changes, the rate of unemployment 
started to fall in the second half of the 1990s. However, after the Russian crisis at the end of 1998 
and, to a lesser extent, due to the Czech currency crises in 1997, unemployment sharply increased 
again by the end of the 1990s. While the economic growth has recovered after the Russian crisis, 
unemployment has remained high in the two-digit zone. 
Figure 1. Unemployment in the Big CEECs and EU6. 
The only Big CEEC that shows a declining trend in the unemployment rate throughout the 1990s is 
Hungary (see Figure 2). However, in the beginning of the 21
st century also Hungarian 
unemployment has increased, but it is still well below 10%. The other country with relatively low 
unemployment rate is the Czech Republic. The currency and stock market crises of 1997 caused a 
dramatic depression with negative economic growth figures for two years.  This resulted in an 
increased unemployment rate, which afterwards remained on that higher level. Poland and Slovakia 
have struggled with very high unemployment throughout the whole period. Also for those countries 
the jump after 1998 is noticeable. Since then the countries have faced unemployment between 15 
and 20%.  The jump itself can be explained by the abovementioned crisis. But the persistent high 
level points to institutional determinants and/or lacking structural reforms. 
Figure 2. Unemployment (right scale) and employment (left scale) rate in the Big CEECs. 
Figure 2  also shows the evolution of the employment rate measured as the proportion of employed 
from the working age population in the Big CEECs. The decline in employment coincides with the 
increase in unemployment in the Czech and Slovak Republics which can be the result of the 
existence of a relatively constant amount of economically active people in the economies. Poland   5
has faced during the last five years a higher employment rate and a unemployment rate over 15% 
but declining. Those trends imply growing economic activity in the country and lagging job-
creation.  
The employment levels are still under the levels of the beginning of the 1990s in the Czech 
Republic and Poland (see Figure 3). Despite the Slovak Republic has sustained a high employment 
level this in 1994, the high unemployment rates imply that the economy is still functioning below 
the pre-transition volumes and the structural changes in labour market are on the way.  
Figure 3. Employment in the Big CEECs 1993-2005. 
The real wages have risen since the beginning of the 21
st century in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary (see Figure 4). The Polish real wages increased throughout the second half of 1990s and 
have slowly declined since 2001 and the Slovak indicator does not show clear trend in its 
movements.  
Figure 4. Real wages and the real wage to productivity ratio in the Big CEECs, 1995=100. 
From the competitive point of view the real wage has to be compared to the productivity. The real 
wages have generally not outstretched the growth in productivity. However, the increase in real 
wages outweighed the increase in productivity in Poland and several years in the Slovak Republic 
in the late 1990s. So the wage dynamics can partly be the cause behind the high rates of 
unemployment in those countries. 
Despite the remarkable speed in overall economic transformation labour market transition is not yet 
complete in the Big CEECs. Despite good growth performance the countries face high 
unemployment rates and relatively low employment rates which gives reason to suspect market 
distortions in effect.   
 
3. Labour market institutions in the Big CEECs 
In the previous section we showed that labour market performance in the Big CEECs is still 
characterised by relatively high levels of unemployment and low employment rates. One reason for 
the relatively poor labour market performance in those countries can be that their labour market 
institutions are supportive to low labour market equilibria, especially after the big shocks that have 
hit these economies. As it is well known, the combination of shocks and institutions is often put 
forward as an explanation for the poor labour market performance in a number of European   6
countries (Blanchard and Katz, 1999). In this section we therefore analyse various aspects of the 
institutional settings of the labour market in Central Europe and the old core European countries. 
Before we turn to the labour markets it is useful to bring under attention some general 
characteristics of the CEECs. This is done in Table 2. In terms of GDP the Big CEECs represent a 
small part of the European economy. In our sample the Big CEECs constitute 4.3% of the total 
GDP of the sample. Indeed, except Poland, the countries have small populations however their level 
of development lags also still largely behind the old EU countries. As Table 2 shows, average GDP 
per capita in the Big CEECs is about one fifth of the old EU members. Even the Czech Republic, 
which is the most developed CEEC judged by GDP per capita is still only at 31% of the level of the 
least developed EU6 country (Italy). Another distinguishing characteristic is the importance of the 
agricultural sector. The average share of agriculture in GDP is 2.5 times higher in the CEECs than 
in the EU6. Again the agricultural sector in the Czech Republic (which has the lowest share of 
agriculture of the big CEECs) is 40% higher than in Italy (which has the highest share of agriculture 
in the EU6).  
Migration is one socio-economical determinant that influences the labour market situation. Positive 
net-migration usually increases the supply of labour and restricts the rise of wages. Negative net-
migration, on the other hand, adds in the ageing societies additional pressure on the fiscal stance 
and inflation.  Table 2 shows that the migration is relatively volatile characteristic in all countries. 
The Big CEECs faced negative crude rates of net-migration in the beginning of 1990s. A decade 
later the number of people leaving their country has declined and in 2004 only Poland had a 
negative crude rate of net-migration. In the other Big CEECs  more people come to the country than 
leave the country and that results in small positive net-migration. The EU6 countries have been 
importers of the people with the average crude rate of net-migration around 2-3%. However the 
changing public opinion on migration starts to influence also the migration statistics and e.g. in 
2004 the Netherlands had small negative crude rate of net-migration.   
Table 2. General economic conditions in Big CEECs and EU6. 
The last characteristic that is considered in Table 2 is the share of the shadow economy in GDP. A 
well developed shadow economy is often a sign of a rigid labour market, as costly and rigid labour 
market regulations and high tawes on labour will shift more and more activities away from the 
official labour market into the unofficial sector. Here too the distinction between the Big CEECs 
and the EU6 is less relevant. Belgium, Hungary, Italy and Poland are characterised by a flourishing 
unofficial economy while the share of the shadow economy in total GDP is relatively low in the 
Netherlands and the UK.   7
While the general structural characteristics of the economy influence the outcome of labour markets 
only indirectly, labour market institutions can have a more direct effect on the working of the labour 
market. They can be divided into three subcategories: 
1)  employment protection legislation; 
2)  wage setting institutions; 
3)  employment benefit system, taxation of wages and active labour market policies; 
Employment protection legislation reflects the restrictions to employers to dismiss workers and the 
required compensation mechanisms in case of dismissals. The strictness of those regulations can 
increase the cost of hiring workers, reduce the flow of vacancies and, therefore, result in higher 
levels of unemployment or lower levels of employment. 
The OECD has developed a methodology for the construction of an index of employment 
protection. The scale runs from 0 to 6 with the strictness of employment protection legislation. It 
covers regular, temporary employment and collective dismissals. In our analysis we concentrate on 
the first two aspects and a compound index based on them. Table 3 shows the employment 
protection legislation index for the Big CEECs and EU6. The employees with a regular contract are 
more protected against dismissal in the Big CEECs than EU6. However, the new members as well 
as the old ones are far from a homogeneous group, the index reaching from 1.9 in Hungary to 3.5 in 
the Slovak Republic and from 1.1 in the UK to 3.1 in the Netherlands. In the case of temporary 
employment, employers in the Big CEECs  face considerably more flexibility than in the six “old” 
EU members.  
Table 3.  Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) in Big CEECs and EU6
1. 
Judged by the overall index (which is a simple average of the indices for regular and temporary 
employment), the Big CEECs are more flexible than the EU6 countries with respect to overall 
employment protection. They are also more homogeneous. Employment protection legislation in 
the Big CEECs is somewhere in the middle of that of the group of EU6 which is characterised by 
wide variations. Further, some tendency for convergence in employment protection legislation is 
noticeable. In countries with strict protection like the Slovak Republic, Germany and Italy, there is a 
tendency for more flexibility (mainly through less protection of temporary workers), while in 
countries with low protection there is a tendency for increase. 
Wage setting institutions are important in wage formation processes and can therefore affect the 
employment throughout the economy. Trade unions play a significant role in wage bargaining in 
most of the European countries. This also holds for the former communist countries. The power and   8
influence of labour unions in wage bargaining can be  measured by indicators such as union density, 
union coverage and wage bargaining centralisation and coordination. 
Table 4. Trade unions in the Big CEECs and EU6. 
The union density has sharply decreased during the 1990s in the four CEECs considered and was by 
2000 comparable to that of the EU6, with the exception of Belgium that is still highly unionised 
(Table 4). Union coverage (the share of workers whose wages and working conditions are 
determined by union bargaining even when they are not union members), however, is significantly 
lower than in the old EU countries except the United Kingdom. Collective agreements cover over 
80% of the labour force in the other five EU countries as compared to only 36% in the Big CEECs. 
As argued by Calmfos and Driffill (1988), the outcomes of wage bargaining may also depend on the 
level at which wage bargaining takes place with bargaining at the intermediate level of 
centralisation leading to a higher degree of wage rigidity. With the exception of the UK in the EU 
countries, wage bargaining predominantly takes place at the industry, i.e. the intermediate level of 
bargaining (Ederveen and Thissen, 2004). The average centralization in the EU6 is considerably 
higher than in the Big CEECs where company or plant level negotiations dominate.  
Besides the degree of centralisation, the aspect of coordination of wage bargaining is an important 
institutional characteristic of the labour market (Soskice, 1990). In this particular context, 
coordination refers to the extent to which wage bargaining takes into account the effects of wage 
agreements on the economy as a whole (internalisation of these effects). While centralised 
bargaining tends to result in such internalisation more easily, it is by no means guaranteed to do so. 
In the case of centralised wage bargaining different trade unions may, for example, try to get the 
better of each other (cf. the political allegiance or “pillarisation” of trade unions in Belgium), or it 
may be the case that central agreements are not respected at the lower levels, which may give rise to 
wage drift. In a decentralised system, coordination may be enhanced by the presence of a pace-
setting industry, which leads the way for other sectors (e.g. the metal industry in Germany), or by 
various forms of government intervention in the wage bargaining process. In Belgium, for example, 
the government has the right to invoke the law in the retention of competitiveness (1996) and, in 
principle, it may also intervene in the wage formation process if wage agreements exceed a so-
called wage standard. 
With respect to coordination the four CEECs form a close group with predominantly fragmented 
company or plant level bargaining and little or no coordination by upper-level associations, or 
fragmented industry and company-level bargaining with little or no pattern-setting. In the EU6 the 
picture is more diverse, with more informal coordination or coordination by peak confederations   9
and/or government intervention in the wage formation process (the exception being France and 
again the UK with little or no coordination). 
The CEECs’ policy-mix to support the unemployed is very different from that of the EU6 (see 
Table 5 and Table 6). Both groups of countries apply passive measures such as unemployment 
benefits as well as active policies such as training, job assistance, public employment etc. 
Table 5. Spending on active labour market policies. 
Spending on active labour market policies is low in the Big CEECs, the average being less than 
0.5% of GDP and close to 10% of GDP per capita per unemployed person (see Table 5). In the EU6 
spending on active labour market policies is on average much higher (both as a % of GDP and as a 
% of GDP per capita per unemployed person). Notable exceptions are Hungary, Italy and the 
United Kingdom.
2 
The duration of unemployment benefits is under one year in the Big CEECs except for Poland (see 
Table 6). In most of the EU6 countries except in Italy and the United Kingdom unemployed persons 
are entitled for benefits longer then one year with the extreme of Belgium where the benefits can be 
paid without any time limits. The generosity of an unemployment benefit system may create 
incentives to remain unemployed for a longer time. Table 6 shows net replacement rates for the Big 
CEECs and EU6 for different family types as a percentage of the average wage of a production 
worker. In the Big CEECs the net replacement rates tend to be lower than in the EU6. However the 
diversity prevails in both groups, so that no firm conclusions can be drawn. Again the United 
Kingdom is atypical for the group of EU6 countries and is more in line with the Big CEECs. 
Table 6. Net Replacement Rates for three family types, at 100% APW
1 and duration of benefits. 
Last but not least, we turn our attention to the tax levels as an important institutional characteristic 
of the labour market. Riboud et al. (2002) and Cazes (2002) have already drawn attention to the 
high tax levels on labour for the CEECs. Indeed as Table 7 shows, average and marginal tax rates 
on wages in the Big CEECs are on average not very much different from those of the EU6. Wages 
are taxed at comparable rates and cross-country variability rather than cross-group differences can 
be observed. 
Table 7. Average and marginal tax rates in the Big CEECs and EU6, 2005. 
                                                 
2 The different evolution of active spending (as % of GDP) and active spending per unemployed  (as % of GDP per 
capita) in some countries can be explained by the evolution of unemployment rate and/or the activity rate in the 
countries envolved. This can be shown by the following relationship: 
a u s s u ⋅ ⋅ =  
With s: active spending (as % of GDP), su: active spending per unemployed (as a % of GDP per capita), u: 
unemployment rate (in % of active population, a: activity rate (as a % of population).   10
The United Kingdom is the country with the lowest average and marginal tax rates among the ten 
countries considered in Table 7. Belgium (average tax rate) and Hungary (marginal tax rate) qualify 
as the countries that most heavily tax wages.  
Summing up, we evaluate six institutional aspects of labour market using weights of individual 
country variables in total variable (see Table 8). In the first step we found average value of over 
years and different characteristics under one broader institution, only for benefit generosity the 
average value the net replacement rates and duration were firstly weighted and then the weights 
averaged for one combined figure. The weights are given in per cents. The last row of the table 
averages all omitted weights up and gives overall assessment on institutional setting of labour 
markets in the Big CEEC and EU6 countries. 
Table 8. Overview of labour market institutions in the Big CEECs and EU6. 
As intuitively expected from the single institution analysis the United Kingdom has by far the most 
flexible institutional framework of labour market in our group. Conservative continental European 
countries e.g. Belgium, France and Germany have the most restrictive institutions. The Big CEECs 
have adopted institutional package broadly similar to the developed EU countries. Labour market 
institutions in the Big CEECs except in the Slovak Republic are rather on the flexible side, however 
they are slightly more rigid than in the UK.  
 
4. Regression analysis 
In this section we continue with the wage equations for the two country groups. The theoretical 
wage curve suggests a negative relationship between the level of wages and the unemployment rate. 
Empirical findings (for example Plasmans et al. (2002)) suggest a Phillips curve relationship 
between wages and unemployment, i.e. a negative relationship between the rate of change of wages 
and the unemployment rate. We use the idea of Blanchard and Katz (1999) who reconcile these 
theoretical and empirical specifications of the wages-unemployment relationship by interpreting the 
reservation wage as depending on productivity and lagged wages. This results in the following 
specification: 
(1) 
t t t t t t
e
t w t z u z pc w pc c w ε δ β ϕ + ∆ + + − − + ∆ + = ∆ − − − ) ( 1 1 1  
where  w and pc are the logarithms of the wage and (consumption) price level, 
e denotes 
expectations, u is the unemployment rate and z is the logarithmic labour productivity. ∆x stands for 
a growth rate. Wage growth is determined by inflation expectations, the level of the unemployment   11
rate (the Phillips curve effect), the change in productivity and an ‘error correction’ term, 
) ( 1 1 1 − − − − − t t t z pc w , implying an adjustment of real wages to (trend) labour productivity over time. 
In fact real wages adjust to marginal productivity, but assuming a Cobb-Douglas production 
function, marginal productivity ( / tt YL ∂∂ ) equals average productivity ( / tt t YL z = ). Inflation 
expectations are assumed to be a convex combination of current and lagged inflation (adaptive 
expectations): 
(2) 
1 1 ) 1 ( − − ∆ + ∆∆ = ∆ − + ∆ = ∆ t t t t
e
t pc pc pc pc pc α α α  
The closer α to one, the larger the influence of current inflation or institutionalized indexation (α=1 
is (contemporaneous) full indexation) and, consequently, a small effect of lagged inflation. 
Substituting (2) in (1) and adding the difference between consumer and output price inflation (to 
test for a terms of trade effect) and changes in the unemployment rate (to test for possible hysteresis 
effects), the estimable regression specification takes the following form:  
(3) 
t t t
t t t t t t t w t t
pc p
z z pc w u u pc c pc w
ε θ
δ ϕ γ β α
+ ∆ − ∆ +
∆ + − − + ∆ + + ∆∆ + = − ∆ − − − −
) (
) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1
 
In this specific setting with adaptive expectations, the impact of unemployment on nominal (∆wt) 
and real (∆(wt - pct-1)) wage growth is interchangeable, as can be seen from (3) and (1). A 
specification along these lines is also estimated in OECD (1997) and Lauer (1999). A theoretical 
justification for this “bargaining-augmented Phillips curve” can already be found in Knoester and 
Van der Windt (1987). Wage growth in the private sector (∆w) is shown to be the outcome of 
negotiations between unions and employers, more specifically a weighted average of wage growth 
claims of unions and wage growth offers of employers.  Unions’ claims are assumed to reflect 
compensation for changes in consumer prices (∆pc), labour productivity growth in the private sector 
(∆z). Employers’ offers are derived from marginal productivity conditions for profit maximising 
firms. The wage offers are shown to include compensation for changes in output prices (∆p) and 
changes in labour productivity (∆z). Finally, the Phillips curve effect is introduced by the 
assumption that the respective bargaining power of unions and employers depend on the labour 
market situation, reflected by the unemployment rate (u).  
In our analysis we are particularly interested in the coefficients for unemployment rate that we 
interpret as a measure of wage flexibility. Equation (3) is estimated for unbalanced pooled data 
using OLS. To reflect the heterogeneity in the wage flexibility in the selected countries we use 
country specific slope coefficients. The sample consists of annual observations for the period 1990-
2005 and the variables are taken from the OECD Economic Outlook Database. w, pc, p and z are   12
expressed in logarithms; the unemployment rate is expressed in levels (as a decimal). For the 
construction of the error correction term trend labour productivity (based on a Hodrick-Prescott 
filter) is used rather than actually measured productivity. 
The regression results are shown in Table 9. The coefficients of the wage equations take the 
expected signs and changes in the unemployment rate turned out to be insignificant. The inflation 
affects wages more in the CEECs which can be explained also the higher level of price inflation in 
those countries. Changes in productivity have significant effect on wages in both country groups. 
The differences between the Big CEECs find evidence also in case of wage flexibility. The wages 
respond to the unemployment at highest rate of 1.05 in Hungary. Hungary has also the least 
regulative employment laws and least generous unemployment benefit system among the Big 
CEECs.  
The wages are totally inflexible in the Slovak Republic. However the institutional framework can 
not explain fully the complete inflexibility of Slovak wages – the labour market setting in the 
country is not more rigid than in ordinary EU country. The labour protection law is comparable to 
Italy and Netherlands and more flexible than in Germany and France. Also the union coverage and 
average tax wedge are lower than in the EU6 countries except the United Kingdom. The reason may 
lie in more overall institutions and the path of transition generally. 
Among the EU6 countries the Netherlands and the United Kingdom form the most flexible group 
and for the CEECs the Czech Republic has a similar flexibility with the coefficient of 0.69. 
However in terms of institutional setting the United Kingdom has by far the most flexible labour 
market among the three countries. 
Table 9. Wage equations, dependent variable ∆(wt – pct-1). 
The 1% increase of Polish unemployment rate, decreases the wages by 0.43% which is close to the 
rest of the EU6 countries. Still in comparison to the other four EU6 countries Polish institutions 
suggest rather higher flexibility for example in case of employment protection legislation, trade 
unions centralisation and coordination, unemployment benefits and tax level. Poland and the Slovak 
Republic have attracted less foreign direct investment, as the foreign investors consider the business 
environment of the two countries less favourable. The big share of people active in agriculture may 
be interpreted as the result of slow pace of structural reforms in Poland. The Slovak Republic has 
also very big employment in government sector that exceeds the indicator of developed countries as 
Belgium and Italy (Ederveen and Thissen, 2004).    13
But the countries with more flexible labour market institutions as the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
the United Kingdom have also more elastic wages. Still the level of employment protection, the role 
of trade unions and generosity of unemployment benefit system are quite high in Netherlands with 
high flexibility in wages. 
However our results do not coincide completely with the previous studies. Contrary to Radziwiłł 
and Walewski (2003) we find flexibility in the Czech Republic and Hungary and total rigidity in the 
Slovak Republic. The latter finding contradicts also Babetskii (2006) results. Hungary has the 
highest wage flexibility in our sample but the abovementioned studies find no responsiveness in 
wages to the changes in unemployment. Only in case of Poland the results are relatively 
comparable. 
In general we can notice the group of countries with flexible labour markets as Hungary, 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. On the other hand Poland, the Slovak Republic, France and 
Italy form the group of the most inflexible countries. So our regression results coincide broadly with 
the institutional flexibility.  
 
5. Conclusions  
The political and economical change in the beginning of 1990s brought also high unemployment 
and low employment to the Central and Eastern European countries. While the depressed economy 
of the CEECs has recovered and the economic growth exceeds the average growth of “old” EU 
members, the high unemployment rates remain a problem. Therefore we can conclude that labour 
markets still face some tackles in their functioning. 
The labour market institutions have often been seen as one measure to influence the labour market 
performance. In this respect we cannot make clear difference between the CEECs and the EU6 
countries. The Big CEECs have designed their labour market institutions similar to the “old” EU 
member states. The UK has the most flexible institutional setting. The institutions in the Big CEECs 
are more rigid than those of the UK but more flexible than in continental Europe. 
   14
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Table 10. Overview of existing research on wage flexibility in the Big CEECs. 
Country Period  Authors  Conclusion  Remarks 
Czech 
Republic 
1996-2001 Galuščák and 
Münich (2003) 
Wages adjust to changes in local 
unemployment in districts with low 
unemployment rates, a low share of 
public sector and for the short-term 
unemployed. Wages are rigid in 
districts with high unemployment rates 
and for the long-term unemployed. 
Based on 
microdata 













No responsiveness of domestic unit 
labour costs to changes in 





Babetskii (2006)  Wage flexibility found for the individual 
time-series and pooled dataset for the 
period 1995-99. 
 




Wage curve similar to the mature 
market economies exists in Hungary 
Based on 
microdata 
 1990-1997  Blanchflower 
(2000) 
Significant wage elasticity of -0.05.  Based on 
microdata 
 1993  Blanchflower 
(2000) 







No responsiveness of domestic unit 
labour costs to changes in 
unemployment was noted. 
 
 1992-1999  Iara  and 
Traistaru (2003) 
Regional real earnings adjust to the 
local unemployment levels with a delay 






Babetskii  (2006)  Wage flexibility found only for the 
pooled dataset and the period 1995-
99. 
 
Poland 1991-1997  Blanchflower 
(2000) 
Significant wage elasticity of -0.1.  Based on 
microdata 
 1993  Blanchflower 
(2000) 
Significant wage elasticity of -0.2.  Based on 
microdata 
 1992-1999  Iara  and 
Traistaru (2003) 
Regional real earnings adjust to the 
local unemployment levels with a delay 








Small responsiveness of domestic unit 
labour costs to changes in 
unemployment was noted at the 10% 
probability level. 
 
 1995-2002  Yamaguchi 
(2005) 
Wages are less elastic in a high-






Babetskii  (2006)  Wage flexibility found only for the 







Significant wage elasticity of -0.05.  Based on 
microdata 
 1993  Blanchflower 
(2000) 







Domestic unit labour costs react on the 





Babetskii (2006)  Wage flexibility found for the individual 
time series and pooled dataset for the 
period 1995-99. 
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Source: OECD Economic Outlook database. 
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Figure 6. Unemployment (right scale) and employment (left scale) rate in the Big CEECs. 
 





























































































Figure 7. Employment in the Big CEECs 1993-2005. 
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Source: OECD Economic Outlook database. 
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Table 11. General economic conditions in Big CEECs and EU6. 




1 GDP  per 
capita








Czech R  54404  5300 4.49 0.6 1.8  18.4
Hungary 52753  5100 5.59 1.6 1.8  24.4
Poland 160654  4200 6.39 -10.7 -0.2  27.4
Slovak R  22343  4200 7.51 -4.1 0.5  18.3
Big CEECs  72538  4700  5.99  -3.2  1.0  22.1 
Belgium 267141  25500 1.42 1.3 3.4  22.2
France 1485067  23700 2.84 1.7 1.7  15.2
Germany 2200061  26700 1.32 2 1  16.0
Italy 976962  16700 3.23 1 9.6  27.1
Netherlands 414017  25400 3.03 3.6 -0.6  13.1
U.K. 1147161  19000 1.53 2.4 3.4  12.7
EU6 1081735  22833  2.23  2.0 3.1  17.7 
All 678056  15580  3.74  -0.1  2.2  19.5 
 
Notes: 
1 – 2005, millions of euro at 1995 prices and exchange rates; 
2 – 2005, euros per inhabitant at 1995 
prices and exchange rates; 
3 – as a % of total gross value added; 
4 – per 1000 inhabitants; 
5 – Data for Big 
CEECs is the average over 2000-2001 by DYMIMIC method, for EU6 average over 1999-2000 by currency 
demand method, see Schneider (2003). 
Source: Eurostat and Schneider (2003). 
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Table 12.  Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) in Big CEECs and EU6
1. 
  Regular employment  Temporary employment  Overall EPL 
 
  late 1990s  2003 late 1990s 2003 late 1990s  2003
Czech Republic  3.3  3.3 0.5 0.5 1.9  1.9
Hungary 1.9  1.9 0.6 1.1 1.3  1.5
Poland 2.2  2.2 0.8 1.3 1.5  1.7
Slovak 
Republic  3.6 3.5 1.1 0.4 2.4 1.9
Big CEECs  2.8  2.7 0.8 0.8 1.8  1.8
Belgium 1.7  1.7 2.6 2.6 2.2  2.2
France 2.3  2.5 3.6 3.6 3.0  3.0
Germany 2.7  2.7 2.3 1.8 2.5  2.2
Italy 1.8  1.8 3.6 2.1 2.7  1.9
Netherlands 3.1  3.1 1.2 1.2 2.1  2.1
U.K. 0.9  1.1 0.3 0.4 0.6  0.7
EU6 2.1  2.2 2.3 2.0 2.2  2.0
All 2.4  2.4 1.7 1.5 2.0  1.9
 
Note: 
1 – Index, scale from 0 (lowest) to 6 (highest)EPL. The EPL Version I of OECD is used for overall 
index. 
Source: OECD (2004) Employment Outlook 2004. 
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Table 13. Trade unions in the Big CEECs and EU6. 
  Union density  Union coverage  Centralisation
1 Coordination
2 
 1990  2000 late  1990s 1995-2000
 
Czech Republic  46  27 25+ 1  1
Hungary 63  20 30+ 1  1
Poland 33  15 40+ 1  1
Slovak Republic  57  36 50+ 2  2
Big CEECs  49.8  24.5 36.3+ 1.3  1.3
Belgium 54  56 95+ 3  4.5
France 10  10 90+ 2  2
Germany 31  25 68+ 3  4
Italy 39  35 80+ 2  4
Netherlands 25  23 80+ 3  4
U.K. 39  31 30+ 1  1
EU6 33.0  30.0 73.8+ 2.3  3.3
All 39.7  27.8 58.8+  1.9  2.5
 
Source: OECD (2004) Employment Outlook 2004. 
1 1 = Company and plant level predominant; 2 = Combination of industry and company/plant level, with an 
important share of employees covered by company bargains; 3 = Industry-level predominant; 4 = 
Predominantly industrial bargaining, but also recurrent central-level agreements; 5 = Central-level 
agreements of overriding importance. 
 
2 1 = Fragmented company/plant bargaining, little or no co-ordination by upper-level associations; 2 = 
Fragmented industry and company-level bargaining, with little or no pattern-setting; 3 = Industry-level 
bargaining with irregular pattern-setting and moderate co-ordination among major bargaining actors; 4 = a) 
informal co-ordination of industry and firm-level bargaining by (multiple) peak associations, b) co-ordinated 
bargaining by peak confederations, including government-sponsored negotiations (tripartite agreements, 
social pacts), or government imposition of wage schedules, c) regular pattern-setting coupled with high 
union concentration and/or bargaining co-ordination by large firms, d) government wage arbitration; 5 = a) 
informal co-ordination of industry-level bargaining by an encompassing union confederation, b) co-ordinated 
bargaining by peak confederations or government imposition of a wage schedule/freeze, with a peace 
obligation. 
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Table 14. Spending on active labour market policies. 
Active spending  
(as % of GDP) 
Active spending per unemployed person 
(% of GDP per capita)  
 
1994 2002 1994 2002
Czech R  0.15 0.17 7.20  4.67




Slovak R  0.51 0.46 8.14  5.05
Big CEECs  0.43 0.38 9.10  10.63
Belgium 1.33 1.25 33.53  42.97
France 1.27 1.25 23.87  31.92
Germany 1.33 1.18 32.52  28.72
Italy 1.36 0.57 30.69  15.10
Netherlands 1.50 1.85 47.15  114.33
United Kingdom  0.53 0.37 11.40  15.11
EU6 1.19 1.08 29.69  41.36
All 0.85 0.85 20.54  31.12
 
Note: 
1 –  the figures exclude the spending on public employment service and administration. 
Source: OECD (2006) Employment Outlook. 
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Table 15. Net Replacement Rates for three family types, at 100% APW
1 and duration of benefits. 
No children  2 children   
Single person  One-earner married couple Two-earner 
married couple 
Duration in months 
Czech R  50  61 74  6
Hungary 43  52 70  9
Poland 52  54 68  18
Slovak R  64  57 83  9
Big CEECs  52.3  56.0 73.8 
Belgium 63  59 74  unlimited
France 73  77 84  30
Germany 61  77 91  12
Italy 54  62 79  6
Netherlands 71  80 83  18
United Kingdom  45  65 65  6
EU6 61.2  70.0 79.3 
All 57.6  64.4 77.1 
 
Notes: 
1 – income of average production worker.   
Source: OECD Benefits and Wages, www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives . 
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Table 16. Average and marginal tax rates in the Big CEECs and EU6, 2005. 
  Average rate, 100% of APW  Marginal rate, 100% of APW 
  No children  2 children  No children  2 children 
  Single person  Married couple  Single person  Married couple 
Czech R  43.8 39 48.1  48.1
Hungary 50.5 41.1 77.2  77.2
Poland 43.6 43.1 45.8  45.8
Slovak R  38.3 31.7 44.4  43.8
Big CEECs  44.1 38.7 53.9  53.7
Belgium 55.4 48.2 66.4  66.4
France 50.1 42.5 55.8  52
Germany 51.8 44.8 65.1  62.3
Italy 45.4 40.9 52.7  52.7
Netherlands 38.6 36.1 51  51
United Kingdom  33.5 28.2 40.6  40.6
EU6 45.8 40.1 55.3  54.2
All 45.1 39.6 54.7  54.0
Source: OECD Taxing Wages 2000-2005 database.  
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Czech R  9.7 6.6 4.7 11.1 6.4  9.3  8.0
Hungary 7.1 7.7 4.7 10.4 6.7  12.7  8.2
Poland 8.1 6.9 4.7 11.2 9.5 9.2  8.3
Slovak R  10.9 10.4 9.3 11.1 7.7  8.2  9.6
Belgium 11.2 16.2 17.1 9.2 22.2 12.2  14.7
France 15.3 10.8 9.3 9.8 14.5 10.4  11.7
Germany 12.0 10.4 16.1 9.6 9.2 11.6  11.5
Italy 11.7 12.6 13.4 10.1 6.6  9.9  10.7
Netherlands 10.7 11.2 16.1 6.7 11.0  9.1  10.8
United Kingdom  3.3 7.0 4.7 10.7 6.1  7.4  6.5
Note: Scale runs from 0 to 100 with the increasing positive effect on labour market flexibility. 
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Table 18. Wage equations, dependent variable ∆(wt – pct-1). 
  Big CEECs  EU6  All countries 






























ut:      








































      
Observations 43  72  127 
Adj. R
2  0.4094 0.6857  0.4658 
DW 2.0220  2.1396  1.9751 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, * and ** statistically significant at 95 and 99 per cent respectively. 
 